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PRIVATE STANDING AND PUBLIC VALUES 
Michael Boudin* 
LEGAL IDENTITY: Tm: COMING OF AGE OF PUBLIC LAW. By 
Joseph Vining. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 
1978. Pp. xiii, 256. $16.00. 
This highly interesting and unusual book has, as a central 
subject of inquiry, the developing law of standing in federal ad-
ministrative litigation. It also has a predominating interest or 
perspective: the concept of legal identity and the role of litigants 
in personifying social values. Finally, its underlying thesis reflects 
Professor Vining's judgment that there is underway a basic 
change in the ordering principles of our legal process. The book 
thus concerns the interplay between these subjects-standing, 
legal identity, and the values that underlie the legal order. 
I 
The common law affords a long history of legal challenges to 
executive and administrative action, but only in the present cen-
tury has this branch of litigation moved from the periphery to the 
forefront. As our economy and society have grown more complex 
and interdependent, the occasions for governmental regulation 
and intervention have vastly increased. In this cycle, action or 
inaction by the government comes to affect more people in more 
ways. The opportunity to challenge governmental conduct in 
court thus becomes ever more vital. So in turn do threshold doc-
trines-like standing-which narrow or widen that opportunity.• 
Professor Vining begins his inquiry with the traditional legal 
order in which disputes about property were a paradigm of litiga-
tion and the protection of property rights was a basic function of 
the courts (ch. 2).2 It was natural for developing civil litigation 
against government officials to be shaped to fit within the exist-
ing framework. Consonantly, suing an official implicated an in-
quiry whether the official had invaded the complainant's prop-
* Member of the District of Columbia Bar. B.A. 1961, LL.B. 1964, Harvard Univer-
sity.-Ed. 
1. Professor Vining has also written in depth about another of the so-called threshold 
requirements, the "ripeness" doctrine. See Vining, Direct Judicial Review and the Doc-
trine of Ripeness in Administrative Law, 69 M1cH. L. REv. 1443 (1971). 
2. J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY (1978). 
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erty rights or analogously protected legal interest (e.g., liberty of 
person) such that, if the official were a private defendant, he 
would be liable to suit. Only if this invasion were demonstrated 
would the court have to address the further question whether the 
official's actions were justified by virtue of his official mandate 
.. ( which in tum implicated questions of his jurisdiction, the proper 
exercise of his authority, and other now familiar grist of adminis-
trative litigation). 
As Professor Vining explains, this framework became in-
creasingly unsatisfactory. One reason was that individuals and 
business enterprises found that their own ip.terests could be dras-
tically affected by official action, or even inaction, directed solely 
at another entity: for example, a contract awarded to a competi-
tor, a rate change ordered for shipment of its commodities, a 
failure to prohibit its misconduct. Litigants also perceived, and 
wished to challenge, the impact of official action on what are 
loosely called noneconomic interests, such as aesthetic or recrea-
tional values. In both Professor Vining's examples, and surely in 
other contexts as well, the traditional precondition of relief-a 
property or liberty interest-could not readily be established, 
even though the practical effect of the official action or inaction 
on the would-be litigant might be hard to deny. 
Courts were not, of course, limited to ignoring repeated de-
mands for review in such cases or, in the alternative, twisting 
notions of property and liberty out of recognition in order to af-
ford review. A third course was to abandon old requirements and 
to evolve new standards for determining when judicial interven-
tion might be justified (ch. 3). The new touchstones that emerged 
included resort to the particular language of the regulatory stat-
ute, professed discovery by courts of a "beneficiary" class in-
tended _by the legislature to have a right of review, the "private 
attorney general" concept and-most recently-the notion of a 
"zone" of protected or regulated "interests." A portion of the 
book is devoted to showing why certain of the older touchstones 
are unsound guides to resolution of standing questions today ( chs. 
5-7). 
Professor Vining's second general subject-"legal iden-
tity"-is essentially another way of posing the question of stand-
ing. In his use of the phrase, it involves the court's willingness or 
unwillingness to recognize before it a person or entity entitled to 
invoke the court's authority.3 And, in standing cases, discerning 
3. Lawyers are more familiar with the concept, if not the phrase,· in a different, 
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"who" is before the court to object to an official action often 
involves the court's perception of the interest or value that con-
cerns or is represented by the petitioner. Of course, the cast of 
would-be litigants may cover a broad spectrum even though only 
a single official action has occurred. 4 
As I understand Professor Vining, he is suggesting that the 
question who may sue has tended to become a different kind of 
question as the scope of governmental action has expanded and 
its impact has become at once more various and widespread. In 
resolving standing questions, judicial concern with the complain-
ing individual and "his" personal stake has diminished; and in-
creasingly, petitioners in difficult standing cases are viewed as 
representing interested classes such as "consumers," "en-
vironmentalists," or "competitors." Ultimately, the class may be 
entirely abstracted-e.g., will the court grant standing in this 
type of case to those plausibly professing injury to their environ-
mental interests-and we will have reached the "personification" 
of values. 
In Professor Vining's terms, when the personified value is 
recognized by a court as a basis for standing, it becomes a 
"public" value. For example: 
Consider whether an individual who does not swim is 
"directly" and "personally" affected by a decision not to build a 
swimming pool. As a "parent," perhaps he may be: Parent and 
child are seen as one. As one who enjoys, perhaps passionately 
enjoys, watching swimming? That would depend on whether swim-
ming watching is understood and valued as something more than 
an idiosyncracy. It may become so with the televising of Olympic 
swimming and the spread of swimming as an art rather than a 
splashing. [P. 176] 
Yet a neighbor opposing the pool's construction because he dis-
liked the blue-green color of the water may never win recognition 
and be accorded standing to sue, however great his aversion to the 
color or his willingness to litigate. His "value" will be described, 
often without explanation, as a mere preference or idiosyncracy. 5 
although related, context: determining whether a litigant has "capacity" to sue (e.g., a 
child, a trust, a union). 
4. For example, the petitioner challenging the condemnation of a house may be a 
home owner whose property is at stake, neighbors concerned with urban blight from 
construction of a new jail on the site, or a historical society seeking to preserve Georgian 
architecture. The illegality charged may be related to, or largely independent of, any of 
those concerns. 
5. As Professor Vining observes, the process of establishing public values also oper-
ates in reverse. Values once accorded weight ( e.g., distinction in social rank)-and at least 
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Connecting these concepts-legal identity and evolution of 
public values-is not the end point of Professor Vining's inquiry. 
True, the concepts may serve as a prism for examining standing 
cases, helping to explain puzzling decisions or to predict the out-
come of cases not yet decided. However, Professor Vining has a 
further and more ambitious objective: to relate the development 
of the standing doctrine to a basic change in the role of courts in 
the legal process and in the values underlying our legal order. 
In his broad view, legislation and administration can be 
viewed as an ongoing, experimental resolution of diverse interests 
and values (ch. 9). No single interest or value predominates in the 
society, any more than it does in any sane person, and there is 
no permanent hierarchy of interests or values. Instead, as society 
changes, different public values emerge and the governmental 
process seeks to accommodate them. Through decisions on stand-
ing, courts help evolve the public values that will be recognized 
in this continuing process (ch. 10). "For in the very recognition 
of a 'person' who is 'harmed' courts formally cap the formulation 
of a value . . . , confirm it in our language and our thought, and 
permit a full and continuous search for its realization to begin" 
(p. 171). 
Finally, this process of continuing accommodation itself rep-
resents an ordering principle that is becoming woven into our 
legal fabric. In the past, Professor Vining concludes, litigation has 
symbolized a legal order of clashing and exclusive claims to prop-
erty-a world in the image of "castles upon hilltops" (p. 181). 
That world is increasingly remote and irrelevant as society has 
changed and as courts have become ever more sensitive to diverse 
values and remote effects. Both in function and as symbol, the 
emerging public litigation may come to reflect not the separate 
claims of individuals, but the vital interdependence of society. 
n 
In 1970, the Supreme Court announced a new formulation of 
standing doctrine designed to sweep away old cobwebs. Standing, 
it said, exists where the petitioner shows that he is injured "in 
fact" by administrative action and the "interest" asserted argu-
ably falls within the "zone of interests" the statute in question 
was meant to protect or regulate.8 Eight years later Professor 
potentially significant in litigation-may cease to be recognized. 
6. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S.150 (1970); 
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 169 (1970). 
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Vining is prepared to describe recent standing decisions as evi-
dencing "intellectual crisis" and judicial behavior which is "er-
ratic, even bizarre" {p. 1). He is not alone is his dissatisfaction.7 
My own sense is that, whatever the doctrine of standing 
should be, at the present time the doctrine has in. practice no 
single rationale or office. It is an umbrella term sheltering a num-
ber of different impulses or considerations. This engenders ex-
actly the confusion one might expect if, in a large family, all of 
the children were called by the same name.8 It also helps to ex-
plain why standing decisions cannot easily be made to conform 
to a single pattern. 
Surely one consideration underlying the standing doctrine is 
a sense that a litigant should be seen to be affected by the action 
he seeks to challenge before the wheels of litigation are set in 
motion. This requisite may not be invariable; and standing is not 
the only doctrine concerned with assuring the litigant's personal 
stake. However, as Sierra Club v. Morton9 demonstrates, federal 
judges usually want more than a litigant and a stake: they want 
a connection between the two. 
Even if the requisite stake and connection exist, however, the 
litigant's interest may be illegal, unwholesome, or otherwise un-
attractive to the court even if the governmental action is clearly 
unlawful. Or, the litigant's interest may be protected in some 
other context but may be so unrelated to the purpose for which 
the substantive rule was established that the court may see no 
reason to enforce the rule for the benefit of the litigant. Or, allow-
ing one class of litigants to sue may interfere with anticipated 
litigation by another class of litigants to whom policy gives prefer: 
ence. The list could readily be extended. 
Standing is complicated by yet another of its traits. Various 
of the considerations treated under the standing doctrine are as-
sociated not only with standing but also with still other threshold 
7. Professor Davis approved of the injury-in-fact test but observed that in subsequent 
standing decisions the Supreme Court was divided in virtually every case. K. DAVIS, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 22.00, at 485-87 (1976). By 1977 Professor Davis 
was driven to conclude: "The whole law of standing is so confused and cluttered . . . that 
the lower courts and practitioners especially need Supreme Court guidance." Id. § 22.00-
.01, at 167 (Supp. 1977). 
8. The evolution of more precise nomenclature probably has more to do with legal 
development than one might at first suppose. In contrast to standing, consider the well-
accepted distinction between "personal" and "subject matter" jurisdiction and the dis-
tinction, still occasionally compromised, between the merger/bar doctrine and collateral 
estoppel. 
9. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
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prerequisites ( e.g., the case or controversy requirement) or with 
what we call the merits of the case. Whether one or another of the 
considerations is resolved by a decision on standing or in another 
phase of the opinion may be a matter of how the case was argued. 
Standing is not only a crowd, but a disorderly and wandering one. 
It is no wonder that judicial policemen have such trouble with it. 
Given the diversity of elements and the overlap of standing 
with other doctrines and with the merits, it is quite possible to 
decide, as a matter of policy, that certain "standing" considera-
tions-possibly all of them-should be detached from the stand-
ing concept and considered, if at all, under other heads, such as 
the merits. In fact, much of the current literature on standing 
seems to urge a recasting of the standing doctrine to simplify it, 
distinguish its elements, or even abolish it as an independent 
test.10 
Quite apart from the multiple roles played by the standing 
doctrine, there are also multiple functions performed by judicial 
review of agency action. Assuring respect for public values and 
evolving those values is a part of process, but reviewing courts 
often have other things on their minds. Depending on the case at 
hand, the court's attention may range from fixing the final out-
come of the controversy to its own program of agency reform only 
remotely related to any individual controversy. 
Which of the various functions are proper, and when, raises 
a quite different set of problems. However, since courts do in fact 
exercise a range of functions in reviewing administrative action, 
it seems reasonable to suppose that these other functions may 
also shape the use that courts make of the standing doctrine and 
thereby shape the doctrine itself. A court persuaded by the merits 
to shake an agency by the neck may have only limited interest 
in "who" asked it to do so. 
There is also a reverse side to the coin. Standing is one of the 
barriers to judicial review of official action. Like most such bar-
riers, it has been pushed back further and further in recent years 
as courts have grown ever more ready to police, improve, and 
reform in matters once thought beyond the purview of judges. 
The extension of standing to new or remote interests, like the 
presumption of reviewability and the demand for "reasoned" 
10. E.g., K. DAVIS, supra note 7, § 22.00, at 486; L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 459-500 (1965); Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Ac-
tion: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claims for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974); Scott, 
Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HAnv. L. REV. 645 (1973). 
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dedsion-making, has gained a propulsive, almost irresistible life 
of its own. In this respect, the Administrative Procedure Act11 has 
become a symbol far more potent than its express language. 
Yet, there are countervailing pressures that resist judicial 
review and those pressures may in fact be stimulated by the 
outcome of such intervention. Even in an interdependent society, 
limits exist on what can be achieved through judicial review. 
Moreover, there are positive costs of intervention, including ex-
pense for litigants, judicial and administrative delay, and substi-
tution of lay decision-making for asserted expertise. There is still 
some terrain, such as foreign and military affairs, which most 
judges are inclined to avoid. The future of the standing doctrine 
may depend, to a considerable degree, on how far it becomes the 
channel for the pressures and reservations that tend to limit in-
tervention by courts. 
Professor Vining's book develops and illuminates a central 
function of the standing doctrine: its role, through the personifi-
cation of public values, in developing the interests society is pre-
pared to protect. Like most "models"-a skeleton, a diagram of 
blood vessels, a chart of the nervous system-this model of the 
standing doctrine teaches by isolating, emphasizing, ,and explain-
ing a single central theme. No reader should need reminding that 
this is not the only theme. Rather, it is the theme that Professor 
Vining has chosen in order to illustrate and illuminate arguments 
and ideas that go far beyond the bounds of standing doctrine. 
ill 
One of the greatest attractions of this book is that it spins 
off intellectual sparks at a great rate. Some it fans into flames. 
Others smolder. A few get stamped out rather firmly. Several 
examples may be of interest. 
A two-page "note" traces the history of standing as a legal 
term of art {pp. 55-56). Standing sounds to our ears like so famil-
iar and basic a requisite that it is natural to seek its source in the 
common-law. But, as Professor Vining observes, common-law 
courts with authority defined by a system of writs "did not need 
to speak of standing. The question was whether a challenger was 
entitled to a writ, whether he had a cause of action, whether the 
writ lay" {p. 55). Compactly, determinations of standing, merits, 
11. E.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976). 
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and remedy were all embraced by the definition of the particular 
writ. 
Standing-properly, locus standi-instead apparently 
emerged in parliamentary practice as a threshold requirement for 
those who sought to appear before parliamentary committees to 
oppose legislation {p. 55). Unless the bill would directly affect the 
opponent's property or interest, he could not speak against it (p. 
55).12 Not until the 1930s did courts in the United States begin 
commonly to talk of standing, although earlier references exist (p. 
56). There is something more than antiquarian interest in tracing 
standing into the parliamentary world, especially for us whose 
courts play so significant a role in the governmental process. 
Later in the book, Professor Vining devotes a chapter to what 
he calls "feigned personalities" (ch. 8). If the applicable standing 
doctrine allows a "consumer" but not a "competitor" to challenge 
an agency ruling on a company's advertising practices, what does 
the court say to the competitor who seeks to make the challenge 
and asserts that he too is a consumer? When should courts ex-
plore the underlying motivation or test the bona fides of the liti-
gant in playing the role the litigant purports to fill? And may it 
be that the feigned role "fuels the popular sense . . . that law is 
a thing to be used and the profession a place for persons of manip-
ulative mind and empty heart" (pp. 125-26)? 
This problem is intimately related to standing, or at least to 
any doctrine of standing that purports to turn on the interests 
being represented or protected. The chapter on feigned personali-
•ties makes brief excursions into other fields of law where the 
origins and purposes of the suit may, or may not, be a basis for 
halting the challenger at the threshold (pp. 124-35).13 Since this 
broader subject could exhaust a volume itself, Professor Vining 
cannot reasonably do more than touch upon it, but one may still 
welcome and enjoy a new vista. 
At yet another point, Professor Vining discusses more briefly 
the implied private cause of action {pp. 107-09). Thus, where the 
statute forbids construction work to commence before 8:00 A.M., 
a neighbor may seek to sue to enjoin work at an earlier hour, and 
12. By 1866, a treatise writer quoted by Professor Vining (p. 66) was complaining, 
with a distinctly familiar ring, that the precedents on standing were "most unsatisfactory" 
and that "[i]n many cases the legal advisers of petitioners were unable to make more 
than a mere guess as to whether their locus standi would be allowed or disallowed." 
13. Among other instances cited are problems of invoking diversity jurisdiction by 
collusive assignment and the testing of shareholder motivation in suits, derivative or 
otherwise, to implement shareholder rights. 
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the statute may be silent on the issue of who, if anyone, is en-
titled to relief. There are both parallels and divergencies in com-
paring this doctrine with standing to challenge administrative 
action. In both cases, a ~le has allegedly been disregarded by 
the intended defendant and the question is whether the private 
plaintiff will be allowed to demonstrate this disregard and obtain 
a judicial remedy. 
On the other hand, the implied cause of action is 
usually-but not always-invoked to secure damages rather than 
prospective relief; and there is usually an official prosecutor or 
enforcement agency primarily charged with enforcing the rule in 
question.14 It is not necessary here to describe the specialized use 
of the comparison made by Professor Vining. Rather, my point is 
that the comparison of standing and the implied cause of action 
is a valuable one that could readily be extended in a number of 
directions. Thus, the book is a continuing provocation to readers 
to carry its hints and suggestions beyond the author's own main 
theses. 
It is also a book of extreme intellectual density. The thoughts 
are compressed so that the cautious reader, anxious not to miss 
a point, is constantly chipping out sentences to consider their 
implications and relationship to other thoughts. The writing is 
crafted, exact, indeed elegant, but the book is written at a very 
high level of abstraction. If written in the conventional style of 
an ordinary law review article, it would be several times its pres-
ent length. 
Fortunately, the style of the book is quite personal. Its high 
level of abstraction and analysis is enriched with illustrative ex-
amples, occasional dialogues, images, and wit. Equally unusual 
are the almost aphoristic passages or remarks which appear from 
time to time. While pertinent to the legal analysis, they could 
readily appear in a book of literary criticism or a spectatorial 
essay. For some, these passages will be the plums in a very fine 
pie. 
The question what a judge "sees" in looking at a litigant is 
at once the most speculative and practical of questions. Chester-
ton once remarked that the callousness of courts _and lawyers 
toward the accused in the dock is not the result of deliberate 
cruelty; it is rather that they do not see the prisoner at all but 
14. Of course, in standing cases there may often be another class of petitioners who 
clearly do have standing to challenge the administrative action. 
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only "the usual man in the usual place." By bringing his spacious 
style and perspective to bear on what is commonly thought to be 
a dry and technical subject, Professor Vining has greatly re~ 
warded us. 
